The United Kingdom
Who's Who Top
Government
Governmental actors with a direct or indirect role in biosecurity and scientific oversight are included here. This is not a guide to overall governmental structure. Some departments listed here may have only a marginal interest or role in biosecurity. This is a “living” document and comments about the content or any potential omissions are welcome. Please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
Prime Minister’s Office
Comment: COMING SOON
Cabinet Office
Comment: COMING SOON
Division(s) within the Cabinet with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Department / Ministry / Agency:
Defence
Comment: COMING SOON
Division(s) within the Defence Ministry with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Comment: FCO is the diplomatic branch of the UK Government. Through its Counter-Proliferation Department (CPD), the FCO strives to deter, check and where possible roll back the spread of WMD and related technology. CPD is also responsible for the FCO's role in export control policy and export licensing for military and dual-use goods.
Division(s) within the FCO with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Health
Comment: COMING SOON
Health Protection Agency
Comment: COMING SOON
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
Comment: COMING SOON
Division(s) within the HSE with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Science and Technology (OST)
Comment: COMING SOON
Division(s) within OST with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Security Service (MI5)
Comment: COMING SOON
Division(s) within MI5 with a role or interest in biosecurity:
Trade and Industry
Comment: COMING SOON
Specialized Institutes / Centers:
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)
Comment: BBSRC is the UK's principle funder of basic biological research. It invests over £336 per year to advance research in all areas of contemporary biology, such as genomics, stem cells, general healthcare, reproduction, and bioprocessing. The Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council (MRC), and BBSRC have developed a joint statement on managing risks of misuse associated with grant funding activities.
Council for Science and Technology (CST)
Comment: COMING SOON
Medical Research Council
Comment: MRC is a UK taxpayer funded research organization which promotes research into medical and related science in order to improve healthcare and quality of life. MRC also has specific mechanisms set up to transfer research and ideas into practical use through products and treatments. MRC has developed a, " Position statement on bioterrorism and biomedical research," and a statement with the Wellcome Trust and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council on, "managing risks of misuse associated with grant funding activities."
National Academies & Academia
Academic actors and national academies with a direct or indirect role in biosecurity and scientific oversight are included here. Some groups listed here may have only a marginal interest or role in biosecurity. This is a “living” document and comments about the content or any potential omissions are welcome. Please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
National Academy:
Comment: The Royal Society is the UK's leading independent scientific body. As well as providing an authoritative voice and leadership for UK science, it provide objective advice for government and policymakers on science, its relationship with society and science education. The Royal Society is well placed to tackle concerns relating to international security as these issues often cover a wide range of scientific disciplines. The Society has held meetings with scientists from overseas, discussed issues with policy makers, initiated studies and produced a number of reports. It has done extensive work on reducing the threats from biological weapons and the misuse of scientific research.
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7451 2500
For more on the Royal Society's biosecurity and "codes of conduct" work see:
The Harvard Sussex Program (HSP)
Comment: HSP is a collaboration between Harvard and Sussex Universities that works to increase the contribution of academia to the formation of public policy involving chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and its underlying technologies. HSP recognizes that CBW are potential instruments of terror, coercion, and mass killing whether in the hands of nations or non-state entities and as a result remedies that recognize the social, political, and scientific ramifications are needed. For example, HSP supports a new international treaty that would confer jurisdiction to national courts on foreign nationals who order, direct, or knowingly render substantial assistance to the use of biological weapons anywhere.
Contact: + 44 (0) 1273 678 172
University of Bradford Peace Studies Department – Biological Warfare Disarmament Research Centre
Comment: The Peace Studies Department at Bradford University studies peace and conflict throughout the world. By working with international and nongovernmental partners, the Department has plans for future growth and development in an attempt to remain at the forefront of the changing peace and security agenda. Through its Disarmament Research Centre, the University is examining ways to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
Contact: + 44 (0) 1274 23 5235
University of Exeter: Biological Weapons & Codes of Conduct
Comment: In cooperation with the University of Bradford Peace Studies department, extensive work on codes for bioscientists has been undertaken at the University of Exeter. The University provides a web-based resources for those considering the place, purpose and prospects of codes of conduct. It includes a chronology of past discussions about codes for bioscientists, notice of relevant events, publications and references information, and links to key organizations. It has been established as part of a research project undertaken by Brian Rappert (University of Exeter) and Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford) funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council New Security Challenges Programme entitled ‘Coding Research: Biological Weapons, Security & the Silencing of Science’.
Contact: + 44 (0)1392 263353
University of Leeds Molecular Epidemiology Unit
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: + 44 0113 343 6602
Comment: SPRU was one of the first centres to focus the field of science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy and endeavor to deepen understanding of the fields and their place in the global economy. Through its work, SPRU pioneers research to further understanding of STI’s benefits to society, advance analytical methods explaining STI’s role in today’s economy, advise those concerned with developing STI policy, and work with those charged with managing STI development to devise better progress strategies.
Contact: + 44 (0) 1273 686758
Industry
This list of companies, with significant life sciences interests, illustrates the breadth of impact on industry that any changes in regulations governing the availability of life sciences information would have. This may include limitations on publication openness, control or review of experiments and research, or various other factors arising from the sensitive, dual-use nature of some life sciences work. This is a “living” document and comments about the content or any potential omissions are welcome. Please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
Acambis
Comment: Coming Soon
Contact: + 44 (0) 1223 275 300
AstraZeneca
Comment: Coming Soon
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7304 5000
GlaxoSmithKline
Comment: Coming Soon
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 8047 5000
Research Institutes & Non-Profits
Institutes and organisations with a direct or indirect role in biosecurity and scientific oversight are included here. Some groups listed here may have only a marginal interest or role in biosecurity. This is a “living” document and comments about the content or any potential omissions are welcome. Please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: rej@acronym.org.uk
Chatham House
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7957 5700
Genewatch
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: + 44 (0) 1298 871898
Institute of Biology (IOB)
Comment: IOB's mission is to promote the biological sciences, to foster the public understanding of the life sciences generally, to enhance the status of the biology profession, and to biology to government and other bodies in the UK and abroad.
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7936 5900
Institute of Science in Society (ISIS)
Comment: ISIS promotes responsible science which, independent of government controls or commercial and special interests, benefits civil society and the public good. The organization believes that science is intrinsically honest and disagreements must be openly debated. Therefore to encourage open debate and public participation, ISIS believes that scientific information should be disseminated promptly in an unbiased and uncensored form.
Contact: + 44 (0) 1994 231623
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Comment: IISS is a leading independent authority on political-military conflict. As a primary source of accurate and objective information for international strategic issues, IISS publications are used by politicians, diplomats, and others within the public sector as well as members of the private sector and public concerned with international affairs. IISS has launched The Charter of the International Council for the Life Sciences, that will commit its members to a code of conduct and best practices to prevent the life sciences from being misused.
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7379 7676
The John Innes Centre (JIC)
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: + 44 (0) 1603 450000
Society for General Microbiology (SGM)
Comment: SGM aims to advance the art and science of microbiology. SGM convenes meeting its board and special interest groups related to microbiology. SGM has developed a Policy on Scientific Publication, Security and Censorship.
Contact: +44 (0) 118 988 1800
VERTIC
Comment: COMING SOON
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7065 0880
The Wellcome Trust
Comment: The Wellcome Trust is an independent charity whose mission is to foster and promote research with the aim of improving human and animal health. It is the United Kingdom's largest non-governmental source of funds for biomedical research. The Trust has recognized that there is potential for the harmful misuse of biomedical research and has therefore developed a, "position statement on bioterrorism and biomedical research," and issued a joint statement with the Medical Research Council and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council on, "managing risks of misuse associated with grant funding activities."
Contact: + 44 (0) 20 7611 8888
Events Top
This is a list of events relevant to biosecurity. This is a “living” document and comments about the content or any potential omissions are welcome. Please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
2006
Workshop: Biosecurity & Genomics
Date: 13-14 November 2006
Location: Edinburgh, UK
Participant(s): Representatives from OECD, US NAS, UK Royal Society as well as social and political scientists
Description: This workshop will explore the emergence of biosecurity controls and their impact on genomics and biomedical research.
Chemical and Biological Weapons: Facing Future Challenges
Date: 29 September - 1 October 2006
Location: West Sussex, United Kingdom
Participant(s): Wilton Park and the International Security Bureau of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Description: This conference was aimed at analyzing questions such as, "What are the prospects beyond the Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference? What are the critical issues in the run up to the 2008 Chemical Weapons Review Conference? How can industry be more involved and what are the implications of technological change for CBW non-proliferation? What are the future prospects for counter-proliferation?"
Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention
Date: 4-6 September 2006
Location: The Royal Society, London, United Kingdom
Participant(s): The Royal Society (RS), InterAcademy Panel (IAP) & International Council for Science (ICSU)
Description: The workshop brought together 84 leading international scientific and policy experts from 23 countries to provide independent and authoritative advice to BTWC States Parties on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Sixth Review Conference, which will take place in Geneva between 20 November and 8 December 2006.
2005
CBW Proliferation: Developing New Responses
Date: 30 September - 2 October, 2005
Location: West Sussex , UK
Participant(s): Wilton Park and the Chemical and Biological Arms Control institute
Description: This conference convened to answer a number of questions related to how chemical and biological weapons regimes can be strengthened.
Joint Statement on Biomedical Research Misuse Issued by the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council (MRC), and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)
Date: 8 September, 2005
Location: UK
Participant(s): The Wellcome Trust, MRC, & BBSRC
Description: Three of the largest biosciences funding institutions in the United Kingdom issued a joint statement on the misuse of research for harmful purposes by terrorists or others. The statement, which builds on previous policies enacted by the institutions to curtail abuse, initiates a change in funding policies requiring applicants to address questions specifically aimed at determining the research's potential for misuse.
2004
Do No Harm: reducing the Potential for Misuse of Life Sciences research (Joint Royal Society - Wellcome Trust Conference)
Date: 7 October, 2004
Location: Royal Society, London, UK
Participants: Life Scientists, Policy Makers and Interested Parties
Description: This meeting was convened in response to the increased Concern of scientific misuse following the 2001 Anthrax attacks in the US and as a prelude to the 2005 BWC experts meeting which will be chaired by the UK and focus on codes of conduct for scientists.
Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity: ICRC outreach to the life science community on preventing hostile use of the life sciences
Date: 7 May, 2004
Location: London, UK
Participants: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the British Red Cross
Description: This one day roundtable brought together representatives of the British life sciences community in order to promote cross-sectoral engagement on the issues raised by the ICRC in regards to misuse of life science research.
2003
Arrests in the UK in connection with a proposed Ricin attack
Date: 11 January, 2003
Location: UK
Participants: Possible Al-Qaeda Operatives
Description: British authorities arrest 23 people and seize equipment in connection with a proposed Ricin attack in the UK. Though Ricin is considered a chemical, this incident underscores the fact that terrorist groups wish to possess such weapons for use against civilians.
2002
Joint Statement from the President of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the UK Royal Society
Date: 8 November, 2002
Location: Science Magazine
Participants: Lord May (President of the Royal Society) and Bruce Alberts (President of NAS)
Description: A joint editorial appeared in the 8 November issue of the US publication Science by the presidents of The Royal Society and the NAS, titled "Scientist support for Biological Weapons Controls". It called for scientists to work with policy makers in order to make progress towards measures that would counteract the threat from advances in weapons technology that could be misused by governments or terrorist threat agents.
2nd Meeting of the Global Health Security Action Group
Date: March 2002
Location: London, UK
Participant(s): Ministers/Secretaries/Commissioner of Health and senior health officials from the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, France, Japan, Mexico, the European Union and the World Health Organization.
Description: This annual meeting is held to coordinate public health activities throughout the world.
2001
Passage of the UK "Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act"
Date: 12 November, 2001
Location: London, UK
Participants: UK Parliament
Description: Through this piece of legislation the UK placed new legal obligations on the scientific community to ensure that their technologies are not misused or misappropriated.
1992
UK issues Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Regulations
Date: 21 December, 1992
Location: London, UK
Participants: UK Parliament
Description:The UK issues guidelines that require all research activity on GMOs to be registered and comply with governmental regulations for safety and security. These guidelines have been revised numerous times since their inception.
1975
Entry into Force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)
Date: 26 March, 1975
Location: Moscow, Russia, Washington DC, USA and London, UK
Participants: 151 States
Description: The BWC adds to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by not only forbidding the use of biological weapons in warfare, but also forbidding their production, development or stockpiling. The treaty does allow for research and development of biological weapons to occur for "justifiable" reasons, such as defence, however, it has no verification or control mechanism to prevent misuse. Top
1969
Passage of the UK Biological Weapons Act
Date: 25 November, 1969
Location: London, UK
Participants: UK Parliament
Description: This legislation served to implement the BWC into the UK Legislative system prior to its entry into force. It placed obligations on all of its citizens, "never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain : microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes."
Legislation Top
Below is a select list of laws in the United Kingdom. As biosecurity is a relatively new and rapidly developing field, many countries have yet to devise or implement laws specific to biosecurity. Since biosecurity has much in common with national security, biosafety, bioterrorism, biological weapons, import / export of dual-use materials, and biodiversity, some countries may develop biosecurity legislation by adapting existing laws within these other areas. Therefore, biosecurity legislation and other laws that could potentially be used as background for biosecurity legislation are included here.
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Export Control Act 2002
- Date: 2002
- Comment: The secondary legislation to the Export Control Act 2002, introduced in 2004, added provisions which regulate the transfer of intangible technologies.
- Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act
- Date: 2001
- Comment: This act amended the Biological Weapons Act (1974) and placed new legal obligations on the scientific community to ensure that their work is not misused and misappropriated including transfers (domestic or export) of biological agents and toxins for which there is no permitted purpose. It also prohibits extra-territorial acts of UK citizens in development or production of biological weapons or aiding foreign procurement of biological agents or toxins or biological weapons. It tightens controls on those in possession of pathogens by requiring government notification.
- Export of Goods (Control) Order
- Date: 1994
- Comment: This order implements export controls and licenses required by the Australia Group. It has been revised since inception.
- The Health and Safety at Work Act
- Date: 1974
- Comment: The act introduced a broad goal setting, non-prescriptive model, based on the view that ‘those that create risk are best placed to manage it’. In place of existing detailed and prescriptive industry regulations, it created a flexible system whereby regulations express goals and principles, and are supported by codes of practice and guidance. Based on consultation and engagement, the new regime was designed to deliver a proportionate, targeted and risk-based approach.
- Biological Weapons Act
- Date: 1974
- Comment: This legislation served to implement the BWC in the UK. It placed obligations on all of its citizens to, “never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents. Or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes."
Biosecurity Code Examples Top
Below are codes of conduct for life scientists that have been proposed, are in use, or are under development in the United Kingdom. If there are any other codes that should be included on this site, please contact webmaster@biosecuritycodes.org.
Institute of Biology: Code of Conduct and Guide on Ethical Practice
Society for General Microbiology: Policy on Scientific Publication, Security and Censorship
UK Government: "Rigour, respect and responsibility: a universal ethical code for scientists."
Wellcome Trust: position statement on bioterrorism and biomedical research
